Carrots and sticks fail to change behavior in cocaine addiction

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Cocaine addiction is a major public health problem that is particularly difficult to treat. Without medically proven pharmacological treatments, interventions to change the maladaptive behavior of addicted individuals mainly rely on psychosocial approaches. Here we report on impairments in cocaine-addicted patients to act purposefully toward a given goal and on the influence of extended training on their behavior. When patients were rewarded for their behavior, prolonged training improved their response rate toward the goal but simultaneously rendered them insensitive to the consequences of their actions. By contrast, overtraining of avoidance behavior had no effect on patient performance. Our findings illustrate the ineffectiveness of punitive approaches and highlight the potential for interventions that focus on improving goal-directed behavior and implementing more desirable habits to replace habitual drug-taking.

Why do some people take drugs by any possible means, seemingly without regard for the consequences? Actions normally constrained by their outcome become “out of control” in drug-addicted individuals, who fail to stop taking drugs despite being aware that continuing drug use provides little pleasure while inflicting considerable damage on their lives. Even the prospect of contracting an infectious disease fails to deter these individuals from engaging in drug paraphernalia. Such maladaptive and ill-judged behaviors may be explained in terms of aberrant learning processes (1), where drug-taking is a learned behavior initially directed toward a conscious desire to enjoy a rush or avoid feelings of discomfort. Such goal-directed actions, whether appetitive or avoidant, are modulated by their outcomes. Following extended practice, however, drug-taking may deteriorate into a stimulus-driven habit that is elicited by antecedent stimuli and is thus performed regardless of any goals (2). This proposal is consistent with the notion of behavior being jointly regulated by goal-directed and habitual brain systems (3, 4) and the disruption of this balance during the course of addiction (5).

Maladaptive behavior in drug-addicted individuals may thus result from impairments in goal-directed control, an enhanced propensity to develop stimulus-driven habits, or a combination of these factors. Preclinical evidence supports both accounts. Exposure to either cocaine or stress amplifies the transition from goal-directed to stimulus-driven behavior (5, 6). Cocaine administration also diminishes information processing about consequences, leading to failures to adjust behavior during goal reevaluation (7).

We studied 125 participants to determine whether a newly learned behavior is under voluntary (goal-directed) or habitual (stimulus-driven) control using both positive and negative reinforcement. Seventy-two individuals met the DSM-IV-TR criteria for cocaine dependence and were actively using cocaine, as verified by urine screen (8), whereas 53 healthy control volunteers had no history of chronic drug or alcohol abuse (table S1). Participants learned by trial and error that an action was associated with a particular outcome, such as earning points toward a monetary reward (Fig. 1A) or avoiding an unpleasant electrical shock (Fig. 2, A and B). We then reduced the value of previously reinforcing outcomes by discontinuing point allocation for certain outcomes in the appetitive task (Fig. 1B) and physically disconnecting participants from the electrical stimulator in the avoidance task (Fig. 2C). We then tested whether participants made fewer responses to obtain the now devalued outcome, reflecting a goal-directed strategy, or whether they maintained their previously learned behavior despite outcome devaluation, as an index of habit.

In participants with cocaine use disorder (CUD), instrumental learning performance fell significantly short of that of control volunteers, irrespective of whether the goal was to make responses to obtain symbolic rewards or to avoid electrical shocks (Figs. 1A and 2B). However, depending on the type of reinforcement, prolonged training had a differential effect on the behavior of these individuals. For appetitive behavior, extensive training rendered CUD patients less sensitive to outcome devaluation (Fig. 1B). They persistently responded to stimuli previously associated with reward, irrespective of whether their behavior was actually rewarded or not (Fig. 1C). In fact, the shift toward habitual responding improved their response rate to the valued outcome (Fig. 1C). The strong habit bias in the slip-of-action test was not due to executive impairments (9, 10), which were assessed separately in a control task (Fig. 1D) and included as a covariate in the statistical model. By contrast, overtraining avoidance behavior had no effect on task performance in individuals with CUD. Despite intact fear conditioning (Fig. 2B), CUD patients continued to show attenuated avoidance responses to the conditioned stimulus...
In the case of appetitive learning, increased habit formation, learned by continued responses to devalued outcomes, implies reduced sensitivity to outcome value. We applied a similar model to examine attenuated avoidance responses to the valued CS in extinction (table S2), revealing that addiction to cocaine (but not to other drugs) accounted for only 9% of the variance ($R^2 = 0.09$; $F_{4,130} = 2.82, P = 0.028$). High levels of impulsivity ($\beta = 0.18, P = 0.047$) and low avoidance accuracy during overtraining ($\beta = –0.67, P < 0.001$) — both associated with reduced striatal dopaminergic neurotransmission (12, 13) — were the strongest predictors in this model, accounting for more than half of the variance of attenuated avoidance ($R^2 = 0.52; F_{4,130} = 15.85, P < 0.001$). These results are consistent with preclinical evidence for impulsivity predicting compulsive cocaine-seeking, even in the face of aversive consequences (14).

Our data provide compelling evidence for impairments in instrumental learning in CUD, regardless of affective valence and whether rewards were primary (shock) or secondary (monetary). In the case of appetitive learning, increased habitual responding may either be an indirect consequence of poor goal-directed action (7) or result from stronger habit learning. Both explanations would be consistent with disruptions of the balance between goal-directed and habitual control hypothesized to underlie compulsive cocaine-seeking (7). By contrast, impaired performance for instrumental avoidance in CUD patients associated with a shock, even after extended training (Fig. 2D). Such impairments in the initiation of goal-directed avoidance behavior have previously been reported in animals after dopamine receptor blockade (11) or experimental lesions of dopamine neurons (12). Although CUD patients undervalued the aversive outcome, overtraining did not change their sensitivity to outcome devaluation, either in terms of behavior or skin conductivity. As shown in Fig. 2D, CUD patients’ responses were comparable to controls when the CS was no longer associated with a shock.

In light of the high prevalence of comorbid addictions in CUD, we sought to determine the extent to which the increased formation of appetitive habits and the persistent deficiencies in avoiding aversive outcomes resulted from cocaine addiction specifically or from addiction to other drugs. We also assessed the influence of vulnerability factors such as impulsivity-compulsivity traits, stress, and poor instrumental learning performance (8). Addiction to cocaine, but not to other drugs, explained ~13% of the variance of appetitive habits in the slip-of-action test (coefficient of determination $R^2 = 0.13; F_{4,117} = 4.48, P = 0.002$). However, reduced performance accuracy during training ($\beta = –0.410, P < 0.001$) and higher numbers of stressful life events ($\beta = 0.30, P = 0.015$) were factors of even greater weight in the model, accounting for one-third of the variance ($R^2 = 0.31; F_{4,117} = 6.32, P < 0.001$). Hence, our results suggest that, in individuals with prior exposure to cocaine and stress, impairments in instrumental learning lead to a shift from goal-directed to goal-independent habitual behavior.

We also applied a similar model to examine attenuated avoidance responses to the valued CS in extinction (table S2), revealing that addiction to cocaine (but not to other drugs) accounted for only 9% of the variance ($R^2 = 0.09; F_{4,130} = 2.82, P = 0.028$). High levels of impulsivity ($\beta = 0.18, P = 0.047$) and low avoidance accuracy during overtraining ($\beta = –0.67, P < 0.001$) — both associated with reduced striatal dopaminergic neurotransmission (12, 13) — were the strongest predictors in this model, accounting for more than half of the variance of attenuated avoidance ($R^2 = 0.52; F_{4,130} = 15.85, P < 0.001$). These results are consistent with preclinical evidence for impulsivity predicting compulsive cocaine-seeking, even in the face of aversive consequences (14).

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tal learning impairments are critical factors in behavior. Nonetheless, impulsivity and instrumental learning impairments consistent with previous findings. Our findings illustrate the particular difficulty of treating CUD: The persistent deficits in avoiding aversive consequences highlight the ineffectiveness of punitive interventions for cocaine addiction. Moreover, the tendency of patients to perform a rewarded behavior in an automatic fashion, irrespective of its consequences, is unlikely to be affected by cognitive interventions that target the enhancement of alternative outcomes. Treatment of cocaine addiction should thus focus on training desirable habits that replace habitual drug-taking while protecting CUD patients from aversive consequences that they may fail to avoid.

REFERENCES AND NOTES
STEM CELLS

Spatiotemporal coordination of stem cell commitment during epidermal homeostasis

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Adult tissues replace lost cells via pools of stem cells. However, the mechanisms of cell self-renewal, commitment, and functional integration into the tissue remain unsolved. Using imaging techniques in live mice, we captured the lifetime of individual cells in the ear and paw epidermis. Our data suggest that epidermal stem cells have equal potential to either divide or directly differentiate. Tracking stem cells over multiple generations reveals that cell behavior is not coordinated between generations. However, sibling cell fate and lifetimes are coupled. We did not observe regulated asymmetric cell divisions. Lastly, we demonstrated that differentiating stem cells integrate into preexisting ordered spatial units of the epithelium. This study elucidates how a tissue is maintained by both temporal and spatial coordination of stem cell behaviors.

issue homeostasis requires the ability to replace damaged or lost cells while maintaining tissue structure and function. A model for studying this process is the mouse adult interfollicular epidermis (IFE), where organized layers of progressively differentiated epithelial cells form a barrier from which suprabasal cells are continuously shed and replenished by an underlying proliferative basal layer (1–3). Understanding how basal stem cell proliferation and terminal differentiation remain balanced in homeostasis is a central question in both epithelial and stem cell biology.

Initial models of epidermal maintenance recognized the three-dimensional organization of discrete columns, called epidermal proliferative units (EPUs), which are defined by the perimeter of the most external, terminally differentiated cells (4–6). An important implication of the EPU model is that each unit is autonomously maintained by an asymmetrically dividing, basally located stem cell, with slow-cycling characteristics (7–9). Recent studies suggest the presence of slow-cycling stem cells in mouse epidermis (10, 11). However, long-term lineage-tracing studies show that basal clones do not strictly adhere to the columnar borders of EPUs and support a model based on a single stem cell population that makes stochastic fate choices, while still relying on mostly (60 to 84%) asymmetric divisions to generate one stem cell and one terminally differentiated cell (12–16). These studies provide critical insights into epidermal homeostasis but remain disconnected and don’t explain how individual stem cells and their progeny are integrated into the existing structure of a tissue.

A major challenge in elucidating cell fate has been the inability to resolve individual cell fate choices within clones. Individual cell behaviors have been indirectly inferred from time series of fixed clonal samples (17). Therefore, we developed an in vivo pulse/chase system for single-cell genetic label retention to continuously track entire lineages across multiple generations and capture the fate of individual basal cells within them (18) (Fig. 1A and fig. S1A). For that, we acquired serial optical sections of the epidermis from the same live adult mice at successive time points and captured the differentiation state of single labeled cells by position and cellular morphology within the entire volume of the IFE (Fig. S1B) (19–22). To distinguish between region-specific characteristics and more general epidermal principles, we performed our lineage tracing in both ear and plantar epidermis. Cells that committed to differentiation were scored by their departure from the basal layer and their gradual movement toward the surface of the skin, which was irreversible in all cases (fig. S1C). Cell divisions in the basal layer generated two daughter cells that remained within the basal layer upon division (fig. S1D). Analysis of division and differentiation events in clonal lineage trees provided direct access to lifetimes and fate choices of individual basal cells, and revealed fate correlations that could not be addressed from static clonal analysis (Fig. 1B and fig. S1A). We tested two key hypotheses: First, we asked whether the basal layer is maintained through a proliferative hierarchy by a small population of stem cells (10, 11); if so, mother and daughter cell fates should be correlated, because only stem cells should give rise to daughter stem cells. We performed this multigenerational analysis in the ear epidermis and detected no mother-daughter bias in fate choice [supplementary theory (ST) S7] or in their lifetimes (Pearson correlation R = −0.11, P = 0.2).

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

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Materials and Methods

Supplementary Text

Tables S1 and S2

References (25–30)

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Editor's Summary

Punishment doesn't work in cocaine addicts

Addiction is extremely difficult to treat, particularly cocaine use disorder. Animal experiments have led to the concept of drug addiction as abnormal goal-directed learning and habit formation. Ersche et al. found that overtraining with positive reinforcement such as rewards made cocaine-addicted patients less sensitive to the outcome of their actions. In contrast, overtraining on a punishment paradigm had no effect. Thus, habits may determine the behavior of cocaine users.

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